These credibility challenges have raised serious concerns about the potential effectiveness of the deposit and verification system, particularly with respect to the new K-group, which is not yet strong. The Level I public had no reason to believe that non-binding commitments – mere promises of action – would be able to do the global public good. For example, Ciplet, Roberts and Khan (2015, 1) commented on a statement by Ian Fry, Tuvalu`s representative: “Fry was furious at what he and many other representatives of developing countries saw as an extremely unequal and ineffective framework for combating climate change.” Putnam`s two-tiered games. Explaining the differences in U.S. negotiating behaviour and the results of international negotiations that are related to it requires a dynamic view of U.S. preferences over time and opens the black box of the single player of the state. Putnam`s two-tiered play framework allows for such dynamic analysis that takes into account changes in national and international variables and the different nastell constellations of their “entanglement” over time (Putnam Reference Putnam1988, 430). Faced with the need to avoid new legal obligations, Obama proposed a contractual architecture that would set similarly legal (non-binding) mitigation obligations for all parties to the negotiation, regardless of their level of development. The obligations of all parties would be totally voluntary, “fixed at the national level” and, over time, not imposed at the international level, but over time. This structure would also address one of the key themes of the national discourse: opposition to differentiation between the commitments of the United States and those of other countries, notably China and India. First, the U.S.
proposals, formulated in the UNFCCC documents, still distinguished countries of thought and developing countries, but stressed that all parties should take “appropriate mitigation measures at the national level” that would be subject to some kind of review (United States and UNFCCC 2009). These two ideas – voluntary commitments (“communications”) of mitigation measures combined with detailed verification mechanisms – would later become a system of deposit and verification. This logic has become an integral part of the Copenhagen Agreement and, after 2009, the statements and statements of the United States have always reinforced the language of the agreement: “The text of the agreement also usefully tilts towards national sovereignty, … delaying the parties in deriving their respective mitigation commitments. We believe that such an approach promotes widespread contributions and effective implementation” (United States and UNFCCC 2010, 81). The New York Times (Broder and Kanter Reference Broder and James2009) quoted Todd Stern, the chief U.S. negotiator in Copenhagen, and justified the proposal as follows: “I felt from the beginning that, unlike what happened in Kyoto, we must keep our international and domestic positions in sync, so that there is domestic political and political support for everything we do. We don`t want that car in front of the horse this time. Given the power of the U.S. Senate to refuse to implement an internationally negotiated agreement that sets new legal obligations for the United States, the Senate has been an important national audience for U.S. negotiators.
And Congressional opposition to international climate agreements has been a stable feature of U.S. policy since 1997. Prior to the Kyoto negotiations, the Senate defined the national interest of the Byrd Hagel resolution passed unanimously. Byrd-Hagel signaled to President Clinton, then a negotiator, that the Senate was not willing to ratify an agreement that would distinguish between DenUSA and other countries, especially major developing countries such as China and India. The resolution was not binding and could have lost its importance over the past twenty years, but it still largely reflects the reality of The Congress.